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East Germany: Soviet Partner in the LDCs

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An Intelligence Assessment

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GI 83-10201
September 1983

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East Germany: Soviet Partner in the LDCs

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An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by

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Office of Global Issues. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations.

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Communist Activities Branch,
OGI,

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*GI 83-10201
September 1983*

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**East Germany:
Soviet Partner
in the LDCs**

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Key Judgments*Information available
as of 31 August 1983
was used in this report.*

East Germany is an active partner in the USSR's drive to increase Communist presence and influence in the Third World. The East German programs are small compared with the Soviet effort but have grown in size and scope to the point where East Germany now provides a number of complementary services that serve Moscow's foreign policy interests. These services range from traditional military and economic assistance to specialized activities such as developing local security and intelligence services, establishing party and media links, and providing technical training courses. East Germany has contributed to the establishment or consolidation of a number of pro-Soviet regimes, notably in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Syria. In addition, East Germany has used links with LDC Communist parties, media, labor unions, and front organizations to increase Communist presence and influence in the Third World. East German programs are most heavily concentrated in Africa and the Middle East, but recently have become more active in Latin America.

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We believe that the East Germans in some instances act as surrogates performing duties at Soviet request and in other cases carry out programs in general coordination with Moscow but with the specifics left to East Berlin. The kinds of activities that appear to be most closely coordinated are those dealing with intelligence and security, military assistance, and covert support to nonruling leftist and Communist parties. Other activities—such as economic assistance—are apparently conducted much more independently, although with Moscow's knowledge and encouragement.

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In addition to supporting Moscow's foreign policy goals, East German relations with the Third World have been driven by its desire to enhance its own international prestige, particularly vis-a-vis West Germany, and more recently, by economic necessity, particularly the need to gain access to hard currency and export markets.

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We expect that the East German interest in the Third World will continue to increase because their activities provide benefits to the USSR and the LDCs as well as East Germany. Of the various East German programs, intelligence and security assistance and political influence activities are most likely to be expanded and pose the most direct challenge to US interests. While Africa and the Middle East probably will continue to be prime targets, recent East German activities in Nicaragua and Grenada indicate an increasing interest in Latin America and the Caribbean.

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East German Programs in the Third World

Our knowledge about the size and scope of East German programs comes from [redacted]

[redacted] Embassy reporting, and East German and Third World press. We are confident that our data accurately reflect the general size and pattern of East German activities, but we are less confident about the specific details of individual programs. Our data show that the East Germans are active throughout the Third World and that their programs are most heavily concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. Programs differ from country to country, but one or more of the following elements are at the heart of East German efforts in each target country:

- *Intelligence and Military Advisers. We estimate that in 1982 there were 1,000 to 1,500 East German advisers in LDCs. Most of them were involved in assisting leftist regimes develop their intelligence and security apparatus. Others were employed as weapons instructors, maintenance and repair technicians, logistic specialists, and staff advisers.*
- *Political Influence Mechanisms. East Germany uses a variety of mechanisms to penetrate or influence key sectors of LDC governments and populations—such as providing political advice and support to Marxist parties; training journalists and supporting leftist newspapers; and exploiting youth, labor, and front organizations. In 1982 friendship exchanges were conducted with fraternal parties in seven*

LDCs, media agreements were signed with at least six LDCs, and some 300 East German youths were assigned to friendship brigades in nine LDCs.

- *Military Supply Program. Since the start of its military supply program in 1964, East Germany has signed military sales agreements worth \$860 million with about 30 LDCs calling primarily for the supply of vehicles, artillery, small arms, and ammunition. Sales reached \$320 million in 1982 alone, reflecting East German sales of vehicles to Iran as well as equipment and ammunition to Iraq.*
- *Economic Assistance. East Germany has signed economic agreements totaling nearly \$3 billion with some 50 LDCs since the program began in 1955. A large share of the recent agreements has been trade credits that call for repayment in hard currency or oil. In addition, East Germany had some 5,000 technicians in LDCs in 1982—three times the number in 1978—to help organize and develop government administration, install and maintain East German equipment, and work on development projects.*
- *Trade. East Germany's trade with Third World countries amounted to over \$2 billion in 1981, accounting for 5 percent of East German foreign trade, as it has since the early 1960s.* [redacted]

Soviet and East German officers reviewing Angolan military equipment [redacted]



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East Germany: Soviet Partner in the LDCs

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East German efforts in support of Moscow's foreign policy objectives in the Third World have led to a substantial expansion of relations with LDCs since the early 1970s. Starting essentially as moral support for Third World "progressive" states and "liberation" movements, East German activities in the LDCs are now varied and include government-to-government diplomatic relations, party-to-party ties, cultural and media links, intelligence and security assistance, training programs, military and economic agreements, and trade.

Although the East German programs are small compared with those of the Soviet Union, they complement Soviet programs by concentrating on selected countries and specializing in those areas that have the greatest potential for influence in LDCs. For example:

- By providing intelligence and security assistance to several African countries, the East Germans have been instrumental in helping to secure Moscow's position in the area.
- By developing party-to-party relations, East Berlin has been able to provide support to nonruling leftist and Communist parties in Latin America.
- East Germany's extensive media activities help meet Moscow's goals of broadly disseminating Communist propaganda.
- East Berlin's support of youth movements and trade unions exemplify East German efforts to penetrate key sectors in LDCs in order to secure current and future political advantage for itself and Moscow.
- East Germany's military supply program, while small, is used selectively to help support the needs of Soviet clients and potential clients.

In addition to supporting Soviet Third World policies, East Germany's activities in the Third World are apparently also motivated by East Berlin's desire to:

- Enhance East German international visibility and prestige, particularly vis-a-vis West Germany.
- Provide East Germany with needed export markets and hard currency earnings to help finance imports from the West as well as from the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries.

Support of Soviet Third World Objectives

Of the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies, East Germany plays the most active role in support of Soviet objectives in the Third World. East Berlin no doubt shares many of Moscow's motives for penetrating Third World countries. East German leaders have frequently stated their support for—and willingness to act as an instrument of—Soviet policy. For example, in a speech to the Parliament in June 1979 on the signing of "friendship and cooperation" treaties with Angola and Mozambique, Foreign Minister Fischer acknowledged that the treaties were an expression of the "coordinated foreign policy of the states of the socialist community." We believe, however, that some of the motivation for East Germany's activities stems not just from shared ideals but also from a desire to enhance its position with Moscow in hopes of increasing Soviet support for East German political and economic interests.

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There are numerous examples of East German activities in the Third World that directly support Soviet objectives:

- East Germans have helped to consolidate pro-Soviet, Marxist-oriented regimes in South Yemen, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Angola.
- East Berlin responded rapidly and fairly generously to the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua, offering \$30 million in military equipment and \$110 million in economic assistance since late 1979. This represents almost 25 percent of total Warsaw Pact aid to Nicaragua. East Germany has also provided limited aid and training to Guatemalan and Salvadoran insurgents.
- East Germany has provided assistance to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Syria, and Iraq in support of Soviet Middle East policies. East Germany's resupply of Iraq in the early days of the

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Media Activities

Through its involvement in Third World media, East Germany has had some success in casting events in a pro-East, anti-West light. Such involvement includes training journalists, providing news services, supporting party newspapers, and facilitating clandestine radiobroadcasting. [redacted]

Journalist Training

The Solidarity School run by East Germany's Journalist Union was established by the International Organization of Journalists, one of the 10 major Soviet front groups. The school has been largely used to train journalists from African countries such as Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Zambia. [redacted]

News Services

The East German news agency, ADN, is increasingly active in the Third World. [redacted]

[redacted]

US Embassy reporting shows that the East Germans regularly supply material to Tanzania's government press service and local Tanzanian newspapers and that the East Germans along with the Soviets regularly plant stories hostile to the West in the Zambian media. ADN pieces are frequently printed in the Ethiopian press. Ghana is reported to receive free wire service from East Germany, and, according to US Embassy reporting, a source who claims to have good connections in Ghana claims that the East Germans provided much of the material for an article on "CIA in Ghana?" which appeared in the Peoples Daily Graphic last December. [redacted]

East German involvement in the media of other countries has been less detectable, but ADN has recently signed agreements with news services in such countries as Burma, Cyprus, Greece, South Yemen, and Syria. In India, East Germany continues to be

active in the media, conducting broadcasts in both English and Hindi and maintaining a bureau in New Delhi. [redacted]

Support to Party Newspapers

East Germany also provides printing equipment and supplies to a number of friendly Third World governments and to nonruling Communist and leftist parties for their party newspapers:

- Grenada recently received a GDR grant for printing equipment for its Free West Indian newspaper.
- According to press reports, East Germany covertly provided financial assistance to the publishing house of the pro-Soviet Greek Communist Party through a front company in Luxembourg.

Clandestine Radiobroadcasts

East Germany has also provided broadcasting facilities to a number of Western and Third World Communist movements including Iran's Tudeh Party and the Greek Communist Party. In most cases, the listeners were led to believe that the broadcasts originated in the target country. The only clandestine stations still operating from Eastern Europe are two that broadcast in Turkish from East Germany: "Voice of the Turkish Communist Party" and "Our Radio." Broadcasts generally follow the Soviet line in commenting on Turkish foreign policy and emphasize themes designed to discredit the United States, NATO, and the West. On many issues, moreover, these broadcasts have been much more critical than the more cautious official Soviet and East German media. [redacted]

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Iran-Iraq war preceded Moscow's own shift to supporting Baghdad, while Moscow was still trying to solidify its relations with Tehran.

- East Germany has been among the most active Warsaw Pact countries in assisting leftist insurgent groups. It has provided advisory support or training (and, in some cases, weapons) to the South-West Africa People's Organization, according to State Department reporting, [REDACTED]

- East Germany provides printing equipment and supplies to pro-Soviet leftist newspapers in Grenada, Peru, Greece, and Portugal and news services to a number of countries including Mozambique, Ethiopia, Zambia, Tanzania, Ghana, Syria, South Yemen, Greece, Cyprus, Burma, and India.

- East Germany is also an active participant in international Communist front organizations such as the World Peace Council and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization. It has representatives on the executive committees or secretariats of nine out of the 10 major Soviet fronts, and one of the fronts—the Women's International Democratic Federation—is headquartered in East Berlin. East Germany has also established friendship societies in countries throughout the Third World and has used these as well as cultural and sports activities as vehicles for promoting Soviet views.

- East Germany has several training programs for LDC personnel that complement Soviet and Warsaw Pact training programs. We believe, based largely on the reporting of military attaches, that more than 1,000 trainees from LDCs—mainly from Ethiopia, Zambia, and Mozambique—underwent military and paramilitary instruction in East Germany between 1978 and 1982. [REDACTED]

- East Germany's Communist Party, the Socialist Unity Party (SED), has continued to develop and maintain direct links with leftist and Communist parties in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America. SED officials frequently attend party congresses and have been involved in organizing and training party cadre as well as providing advice and other support. For instance, after the visit of an SED Central Committee Politburo delegation to Congo in 1981, an agreement was signed with the Congolese Labor Party calling for closer ties with the SED, including continued training of Congolese party cadre, according to a State Department report. [REDACTED]

Coordination of Activities

There appears to be coordination and some specialization of activities between the USSR and East Germany in the Third World. The degree of coordination apparently varies depending partly on geopolitical interests, but, in general, Soviet-East German coordination appears to be most prevalent in activities dealing with arms sales, intelligence and military technical assistance, party cadre development, and support to liberation movements. [REDACTED]

More coordination and specialization—particularly between the USSR, East Germany, and, in some instances, Cuba—is evident in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America than in other regions. In Ethiopia and Angola, for example, Moscow has provided the bulk of the Bloc military and economic aid, Cuba has supplied combat troops, while the East Germans have concentrated on strengthening and reorganizing local intelligence and security services. The apparent coordination of East German, Cuban, and Soviet activities, as well as East Germany's increased role in Africa, may have been the result of an understanding reached by the three countries in 1977 when Cuban President Fidel Castro and later Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov visited East Berlin. [REDACTED]

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Ethiopian journalists being
taught by East German instruc-
tors



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[REDACTED]

In Latin America—particularly in Nicaragua—a stronger East German effort in the area seems to have followed party leader Honecker's visit to Cuba in early 1980. The visit culminated in the signing of a 25-year friendship and cooperation treaty, the first of its kind signed by Cuba with a Warsaw Pact state. According to US Embassy reporting, East Germany now has a 110-man contingent of military and economic technicians in Nicaragua, complementing an estimated Soviet presence of 260. The East Germans have concentrated on assisting the Nicaraguans to develop their security and party apparatus. They have also supplied over 800 trucks to Nicaragua through June 1983. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Arms Sales. According to State Department and military attache reporting, Warsaw Pact arms sales are coordinated with and, in some instances, orchestrated by Moscow—the amount of Soviet control varying with the size of the order, the type of equipment involved, and the political importance Moscow attaches to the client/supplier relationship. East Germany's military equipment sales account for less than 3 percent of total Warsaw Pact sales to the Third World. As is the case with other Warsaw Pact suppliers, sales are concentrated in a few Soviet-supported states in:

- The Middle East—Iraq, Iran, Syria, North Yemen, and Libya.
- Sub-Saharan Africa—Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Zambia.
- Latin America—primarily Nicaragua (figure 1 and table 1). [REDACTED]

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
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Figure 1
East Germany: Military Sales With LDCs

Percent


1964-77

Total: \$147 million



1978-82

Total: \$713 million



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Syrian military. Moreover, he expected the Soviets to funnel some military equipment shipments to Syria through East Germany.

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- A Syrian journalist based in East Berlin recently told the US Embassy there that East Germany—with Soviet backing—will play a role in training the

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Table 1 *Million US \$*
East Germany: Military Relations
With Non-Communist LDCs, 1964-82

	Agreements	Deliveries
Total	860	588
Sub-Saharan Africa	211	209
Angola	79	79
Benin	NA	..
Cameroon	NEGL	NEGL
Congo	2	2
Ethiopia	42	42
Ghana	2	..
Guinea	2	2
Guinea-Bissau	1	1
Madagascar	1	1
Mozambique	53	53
Senegal	NA	NA
Tanzania	5	5
Zaire	NEGL	NEGL
Zambia	24	24
North Africa	18	..
Libya	18	..
Middle East	600	348
Egypt	8	8
Iran	208	17
Iraq	292	231
Lebanon	NEGL	NEGL
North Yemen	19	19
South Yemen	2	2
Syria	65	65
United Arab Emirates	6	6
East and South Asia	1	1
Afghanistan	NA	NA
Bangladesh	NEGL	NEGL
Burma	NEGL	NEGL
India	NEGL	NEGL
Indonesia	1	1
Latin America	30	30
Guyana	NEGL	NEGL
Nicaragua	30	30

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Table 2		Number of persons
East Germany: Intelligence and Military Advisers in LDCs, 1982 ^a		
Total		1,000-1,500
Africa		640-890
Angola		200-250
Congo		20
Ethiopia		250-300
Guinea-Bissau		15-30
Zambia		40
Other		115-250
Middle East		300-550
Syria		200-300
South Yemen		75-150
Other		25-100
Latin America		60
Nicaragua		60

^a Estimated number present for one month or more.

[Redacted]

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Support of Liberation Movements. East Germany's support of liberation and revolutionary movements has also closely paralleled that of the Soviet Union. For example, the East Germans joined the Soviets in backing Mozambique's FRELIMO and Angola's MPLA long before these regimes came to power. On some occasions, the East Germans appear to have been used to establish contact with a movement when it was politically inopportune for Moscow to do so.

[Redacted] East Berlin established close relations with the PLO when Moscow officially treated it with caution; the PLO opened an office in East Berlin in 1973, three years before opening one in Moscow. Similarly, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) opened an office in East Berlin in 1978, the first of its kind in the Soviet Bloc. [Redacted]

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Honecker receiving Zambian
General Secretary Humphrey
Mulemba



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Other Motives

In addition to backing Moscow, East German activities in the Third World also support two of East Berlin's most important foreign policy objectives:

- The East German desire for international recognition and prestige comparable to West Germany.
- More recently, the need for increased earnings of hard currency or opportunities to barter with LDC raw materials for East German goods or services.

The International Prestige Factor

The desire to attain recognition as a legitimate sovereign state is not the driving force it once was, as most states now recognize East Germany. Nevertheless, we believe that the rivalry with West Germany for prestige and influence in the Third World remains strong. With this in mind, the East Germans have paid special attention to liberation movements and new regimes in Africa and the Middle East. In agreements signed with Third World countries, the East Germans try to insert references to the inviolability of the inter-German frontier and to seek acknowledgment that West Berlin is not part of West

Germany. In May 1978 the East German Ambassador persuaded Guinea-Bissau to shelve an \$8 million aid agreement with Bonn because it contained a clause that endorsed the special ties between West Germany and West Berlin.

East Berlin uses the image of increased prestige it has gained in the Third World to bolster the legitimacy of the East German Government with its own people. Support of foreign revolutionary causes is justified to the East German populace as a necessary contribution of the "ultimate victory" of Communism over imperialism. East German Communist Party leader Honecker and other high-level East German officials have made frequent visits to Africa, the Middle East, and other Third World regions. These visits as well as those of Third World governments and party leaders to East Germany are well publicized in the East German and Bloc media.

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Honecker meeting with YAR
Vice President Abdul Aziz
Abdul Ghani [redacted]



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East Germany's investment has paid off well in gains in international recognition and prestige. At the beginning of 1970, East Germany was recognized by only seven non-Communist countries. Today it has formal relations with over 130 and assistance agreements with 50. It has gained influence and respect, particularly in Africa and the Middle East where it has established close relations with a number of countries as well as with many of the leading African revolutionary movements and the PLO. It has signed treaties of friendship and cooperation with Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan and a joint declaration of friendship and cooperation with Syria. Its influence also appears to be increasing in other countries such as Zambia and Nicaragua. [redacted]

The East Germans, nevertheless, have also suffered some setbacks. According to Embassy reporting, East German police advisers in Somalia were sent home in 1981 when Mogadishu refused to renew their contracts, presumably a reflection of Somalia's distancing itself from the Soviet Bloc. [redacted]


The East Germans also experienced a setback in Zimbabwe that they now appear to be reversing. East Germany, along with Czechoslovakia and the USSR, backed the ZAPU which lost out to Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). [redacted]

Economic Considerations

Although East Germany's economic and military programs in the Third World were at first motivated more by political and ideological considerations, East Germany began to increase its emphasis on economic considerations in the mid-1970s (figure 2 and table 3). At that time, economic constraints began impinging on East Berlin's willingness to provide financial aid to Third World countries. [redacted]

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Figure 2
East Germany: Economic Agreements With LDCs



[Redacted]

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*East German supplies being un-
 loaded in Mozambique*



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Der Spiegel

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Table 3
East Germany: Economic Aid to
Non-Communist LDCs, 1955-82

Million US \$

	Extended	Drawn		Extended	Drawn
Total ^a	2,976	959	Laos	1	1
North Africa	402	135	Philippines	30	2
Algeria	377	127	Latin America	509	122
Tunisia	25	8	Bolivia	15	3
Sub-Saharan Africa	703	191	Brazil	219	19
Angola	20	16	Chile	20	15
Burundi	NEGL	NEGL	Colombia	60	5
Cape Verde	7	4	Grenada	16	5
Congo	27	23	Guyana	36	17
Ethiopia	235	32	Mexico	20	4
Ghana	64	15	Nicaragua	112	45
Guinea	24	24	Panama	4	3
Guinea-Bissau	5	5	Uruguay	6	6
Madagascar	9	1	Middle East	1,001	390
Mali	NEGL	NEGL	Egypt	264	170
Mozambique	104	41	Iran	100	..
Sao Tome and Principe	5	..	Iraq	84	55
Somalia	1	1	North Yemen	10	10
Sudan	46	18	South Yemen	42	32
Tanzania	19	5	Syria	451	122
Uganda	24	1	Turkey	50	..
Zambia	96	2	South Asia	166	81
Zimbabwe	16	2	Afghanistan	42	15
East Asia	195	40	Bangladesh	25	12
Burma	8	8	India	2	2
Indonesia	144	29	Pakistan	35	10
Kampuchea	12	NEGL	Sri Lanka	62	42

^a Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.



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New measures during the past five years to increase economic returns from LDC relationships have included:

- Opening new markets for East German equipment by expanding the size and scope of credits provided under trade agreements. Of the \$1.7 billion in economic agreements signed in 1978-82, \$1.3 billion

were trade credits, usually carrying 10-year repayment terms at 4.5- to 9-percent interest. According to an East German official, only countries with good credit records are being allowed deferred payment terms.

- Focusing on agreements with countries that can pay in hard currency or in needed raw materials such as oil. This pattern has become more pronounced in both military and economic agreements over the past five years. Three-fourths of the \$1.7 billion in economic agreements is repayable in hard currency, oil, or other raw materials. Seventy percent of the \$710 million in East German military agreements with non-Communist LDCs over the past five years have been with Middle Eastern oil producers, payable in oil or hard currency.
- Raising charges for technical services and requiring payment in hard currency. Because of the heavy concentration of personnel in countries that had been targeted for ideological purposes, East Germany had not enjoyed the same hard currency returns that other East European countries had been earning on their technical services programs.

Thus far the East German economic initiatives in Third World countries have had limited results (table 4). Total exports to LDCs amounted to only \$1 billion in 1981—down slightly from 1980—with the LDC share of East German trade steady at 5 percent since the early 1960s. Nevertheless, military deliveries in 1981 accounted for about 10 percent of exports, generating at least \$100 million in hard currency. Further hard currency earnings came from Iran, Iraq, and Libya, which together accounted for more than one-third of East Germany's Third World exports. We expect income from military sales to increase as LDCs take delivery of equipment from a record \$320 million in contracts signed in 1982.

Outlook

We believe that most East German programs will continue to grow over the next several years. In our view, economic aid and trade agreements will grow only slightly—the emphasis being on hard currency

Table 4 *Million US \$*
East Germany: Trade With
Major LDC Partners

	1975	1980	1981
Total	947	2,295	2,041
North Africa	43	352	243
Algeria	21	163	76
Libya	4	152	150
Morocco	14	19	12
Tunisia	4	18	5
Sub-Saharan Africa	17	259	257
Angola	..	83	60
Congo	NEGL	1	4
Ethiopia	NEGL	40	19
Ghana	4	15	14
Mozambique	..	83	112
Nigeria	1	14	45
Sudan	10	8	2
Tanzania	2	15	1
East Asia	13	48	43
Indonesia	6	22	28
Malaysia	7	26	15
Latin America	139	389	412
Argentina	8	66	72
Brazil	75	182	200
Colombia	11	67	43
Mexico	10	64	80
Peru	35	10	17
Middle East	526	927	711
Egypt	183	93	89
Iran	18	166	184
Iraq	218	455	216
Kuwait	9	11	12
Lebanon	17	33	38
Syria	60	118	130
Turkey	21	51	42
South Asia	113	145	189
India	100	134	180
Pakistan	5	6	4
Sri Lanka	8	5	5
Europe	96	175	186
Cyprus	2	11	9
Greece	52	105	82
Portugal	11	8	9
Spain	31	51	86

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East German aid: airliner carrying Nicaraguan wounded to East Berlin for treatment




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earnings—and will have little direct impact on the United States. In contrast, East Germany probably will make increased use of its intelligence and security training programs and its political influence mechanisms, activities that affect US interests more directly. In addition, East Berlin's military supply program, while small in comparison to Moscow's, can be used selectively in those areas where Moscow is reluctant to show its hand directly. [redacted]

We believe that these trends are already evident in recent East German moves:



- During 1982 East Berlin signed agreements to provide news services to the local press in Greece, Cyprus, and Syria and provided a grant for newspaper printing equipment to the government of Grenada. [redacted]

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We expect that countries in Africa and the Middle East will remain prime targets for East Germany, but the opportunities for increased East German involvement in Latin America may be of most concern to the

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Grenada's Prime Minister
Maurice Bishop visiting
Dresden



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United States. East Germany's recent efforts in Central America and the Caribbean, its ties to leftist and Communist groups, and its effort to develop economic relations in the region indicate a growing interest in Latin America. How much further East Berlin will go is not yet clear. In considering this question, East Berlin will have to balance its desire for ties and influence with revolutionary regimes and nonruling leftist parties with its efforts to develop relations with countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, where East Germany has a growing economic stake.

For the USSR, the presence of its Warsaw Pact ally in the Third World takes some of the burden off Moscow and helps diffuse some of the Western and Third World criticism of superpower interference. The Soviets can be expected to again look to the East Germans to test the waters in a target LDC when it is politically inopportune for them to do so. The LDCs benefit from East German programs because of the specialized technical expertise the East Germans have developed.

The impetus for continued expansion of East German activities in the Third World comes from the potential benefits to all parties—the East Germans, the USSR, and the LDCs themselves. In addition to helping secure its international position, East Germany's active role in the Third World reinforces its special relationship with Moscow. It also provides some opportunities—albeit as yet small—for economic gain.

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Appendix

Supplemental Data on
East German Military and
Economic Assistance ProgramsTable A-1
East Germany: Military Agreements With LDCs, 1964-82

Million US \$

Recipient	1964-75	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	Total
Total	45	21	81	100	10	222	63	319	860
North Africa	18	18
Libya	18	18
Sub-Saharan Africa	5	18	80	39	5	63	1	NA	211
Angola	..	14	50	10	..	5	79
Benin	NA	NA
Cameroon	NEGL	NA	NEGL
Congo	2	NEGL	2
Ethiopia	16	24	NEGL	2	42
Ghana	2	2
Guinea	2	2
Guinea-Bissau	1	..	1
Madagascar	1	1
Mozambique	..	4	14	..	5	30	53
Senegal	NA	NA
Tanzania	3	2	5
Zaire	NEGL	NEGL
Zambia	1	..	23	..	NA	24
East Asia	1	1
Burma	NEGL	NEGL
Indonesia	1	1
Latin America	5	..	2	23	30
Guyana	NEGL	..	NEGL
Nicaragua	5	..	2	23	30
Middle East	39	3	1	61	NEGL	159	60	277	600
Egypt	8	8
Iran	4	204	208
Iraq	16	3	1	8	..	153	50	61	292
Lebanon	NEGL	NEGL
North Yemen	1	6	12	19
South Yemen	2	2
Syria	12	53	NEGL	65
United Arab Emirates	6	6
South Asia	NEGL	NEGL	NA	NA
Afghanistan	NA	NA
Bangladesh	..	NEGL	NEGL
India	NEGL	NEGL

Table A-2
East Germany: Type of Military
Equipment Provided
to Non-Communist LDCs

Country	Equipment
Sub-Saharan Africa	
Angola	Small arms, ammunition, trucks, trailers, other vehicles, spare parts
Congo	Small arms, ammunition, other ground force materiel
Ethiopia	Antiaircraft guns, small arms, ammunition, medical supplies
Guinea	Unidentified equipment and training
Guinea-Bissau	Fighter aircraft
Mozambique	Fighter aircraft, tanks, assault guns, anti-aircraft guns, armored personnel carriers, training
Tanzania	Patrol craft, small arms, ammunition, trucks
Zaire	Communications equipment
Zambia	Artillery weapons and ammunitions, vehicles
Middle East	
Egypt	Transport aircraft, vehicles, communications equipment
Iran	Trucks, vehicles, spare parts
Iraq	Artillery, small arms, vehicles, ammunition
Lebanon	Ammunition
Syria	Jet fighter aircraft, electronic equipment, small arms, ammunition
North Yemen	Artillery, vehicles, small arms
South Yemen	Artillery, armored cars, small arms
East Asia	
Burma	Vehicles
Indonesia	Vehicles
South Asia	
Bangladesh	Telecommunications equipment
India	Small arms
Latin America	
Nicaragua	Vehicles
Guyana	River patrol boats

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Table A-3
East Germany: Economic Credits and Grants Extended to LDCs*Million US \$*

Recipient	1955-75	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	Total
Total ^a	796	222	277	965	91	113	404	108	2,976
North Africa	131	21	250	..	402
Algeria	127	250	..	377
Tunisia	4	21	25
Sub-Saharan Africa	91	27	64	287	67	42	92	32	703
Angola	..	20	..	NEGL	20
Burundi	NEGL	..	NEGL
Cape Verde	..	6	1	..	7
Congo	5	..	22	27
Ethiopia	1	..	23	207	1	..	2	..	235
Ghana	22	42	NEGL	64
Guinea	4	NEGL	20	24
Guinea-Bissau	5	5
Madagascar	..	NEGL	..	NEGL	NEGL	8	8
Mali	NEGL	NEGL
Mozambique	5	1	9	2	..	2	75	10	104
Sao Tome and Principe	5	5
Somalia	1	..	NEGL	1
Sudan	46	NEGL	46
Tanzania	7	12	19
Uganda	22	1	23
Zambia	64	32	96
Zimbabwe	14	2	16
East Asia	90	..	75	30	195
Burma	8	8
Indonesia	69	..	75	144
Kampuchea	12	12
Laos	1	1
Philippines	30	30
Latin America	60	60	40	206	24	14	62	43	509
Bolivia	..	5	10	15
Brazil	19	200	219
Chile	20	20
Colombia	5	55	60
Grenada	16	16
Guyana	10	..	20	6	36
Mexico	20	20
Nicaragua	20	4	62	26	112
Panama	4	4
Uruguay	6	6

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Table A-3
East Germany: Economic Credits and Grants Extended to LDCs (continued)

Million US \$

Recipient	1955-75	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	Total
Middle East	355	100	98	400	..	15	..	33	1,001
Egypt	136	..	95	33	264
Iran	..	100	100
Iraq	84	84
North Yemen	10	10
South Yemen	24	..	3	NA	..	15	42
Syria	101	350	451
Turkey	50	50
South Asia	69	35	..	20	..	42	166
Afghanistan	42	42
Bangladesh	25	25
India	2	2
Pakistan	..	35	35
Sri Lanka	42	20	62

^a Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.



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Table A-4
East Germany: Economic Technicians in
Non-Communist LDCs, 1982

	Number of Persons ^a
Total	4,835
North Africa	700
Algeria	250
Libya	400
Tunisia	50
Sub-Saharan Africa	2,510
Angola	750
Ethiopia	500
Guinea	200
Mozambique	800
Zambia	100
Other	160
Latin America	105
Grenada	10
Guyana	15
Nicaragua	50
Other	30
Middle East	1,405
Egypt	100
Iraq	350
South Yemen	500
Syria	350
Other	105
South Asia	115
Afghanistan	100
Other	15

^a Number present for one month or more, rounded to the nearest 5.

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